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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we present three counterfeiting attacks on
the block-wise dependent fragile watermarking schemes. We
consider vulnerabilities such as the exploitation of a weak
correlation among block-wise dependent watermarks to mod-
ify valid watermarked images, where they could still be ver-
ified as authentic, though they are actually not. Exper-
imental results successfully demonstrate the practicability
and consequences of the proposed attacks for some relevant
schemes. The development of the proposed attack models
can be used as a means to systematically examine the secu-
rity levels of similar watermarking schemes.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
I.0 [Security and Privacy]: Miscellaneous—watermark-
ing and data-hiding, attacks modelling, security analysis;
K.4.6.3 [Image manipulation]: Applications
General Terms
Algorithms, Performance, Reliability, Security
Keywords
Authentication, Counterfeiting Attacks, Fragile Watermark
1. INTRODUCTION
Digital watermarking has led to developing many image
authentication schemes [6, 16, 2, 5, 12, 19, 18]. These
schemes are based on fragile watermarking and mainly de-
tect any modifications in an image by comparing the embed-
ded watermark(s) with the regenerated watermark(s). For a
match, a detector authenticates the input image, otherwise
it outputs a failure. Some fragile watermarking schemes [2,
6] use reversible embedding, where restoring to original im-
age is required later on. The other fragile schemes [16, 5, 12,
19, 18] use non-reversible embedding to avoid computational
overhead. A non-reversible fragile watermarking further can
be block-wise independent [16, 18] or block-wise dependent [5,
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12, 19]. In the first category, a non-overlapping block in an
image is independently watermarked using information de-
rived from the same block, a logo, or other images, etc.
The latter category employs a mapping sequence (e.g ., one
to one) using a secret key, and makes watermarked image
blocks dependent on the others. In what follows, an ‘(image)
authentication scheme’ refers to a ‘block-wise dependent wa-
termarking scheme’.
While interest in developing image authentication schemes
is evident, concerns about their security level are remain-
ing [14]. Although robust watermarking security has been
studied in some seminal works [1, 10, 17], we focus here on
its counterpart—fragile watermarking security. Fragile wa-
termarking often disregards any active attacks that directly
modify images, considering any modifications would invalid
the embedded watermarks and thus be detected. Such a con-
sideration, however, leaves the door open for an attacker to
possibly modify the image, where the embedded watermarks
remain valid for the resultant modifications, to counterfeit
the detector. We call these active attacks as counterfeiting
attacks. Though the consequences of these attacks can be
inarguably severe, expected attack models and necessary se-
curity analysis for an image authentication framework have
not been accomplished yet. Thus, the security level of many
authentication schemes remains undetermined.
Contribution. In support of (i) improving reliability of
the authentication schemes and (ii) raising their security
awareness, in this paper, we identify the expected attack-
ers (that consider different levels of modification to output
an attacked image), establish their winning condition, and
develop their models. Thereby, we later argue that our pro-
posed attack models capture all possible instances of coun-
terfeiting scenarios for an image authentication scheme. We
also show with the practicability of the proposed attacks
that how an authentication scheme may violate a system-
atic definition of security.
Paper Structure. Section 2 briefly reviews the literature.
Section 3 presents a general framework for authentication
schemes. Proposed attacks and their models are discussed
in section 4. Section 5 discusses the practicability and im-
plementation of the attacks. Section 6 demonstrates the
consequences of the attacks for two schemes [5, 19]. Finally,
conclusions and future work are given in section 7.
2. RELATEDWORKS
Relevant works that addressed the counterfeiting scenar-
ios for different fragile watermarking schemes are briefly re-
viewed in this section.
Holliman and Memon [9] demonstrated a vector quanti-
zation(VQ) counterfeiting attack for some block-based wa-
termarking schemes. The authors described an embedding
property that embeds a watermark into a host image in a
block-wise independent fashion, and makes the schemes vul-
nerable to their VQ attack. One consequence is that there
exist equivalence classes for each block containing a simi-
lar watermark for a given key. Although that embedding
property certainly plays an important role, the definition
of an equivalence class does not apply, if the watermarks
are block-wise dependent, and thus the VQ attack becomes
invalid.
A variation of the VQ attack is studied in a collage at-
tack [7] for a relatively ‘weaker’ attacker. Unlike a VQ at-
tack, that collage attack assumes that an attacker has no
valid ‘secret-data’ (i.e., key and logo—as the watermark)
but a set of (large number) valid watermarked images with
the same key and logo. However, similar to VQ attack, such
a collage attack is not valid for the ‘block-wise dependence’
property of an image authentication schemes.
Later, He et al . [8] explored the possibility of unautho-
rised recovery of the one-to-one mapping in block-wise de-
pendent watermarks, and thereby output a counterfeit wa-
termarked image. Similarly, Chang et al . [3] proposed a
dictionary attack that uses the correlation of the mapped
blocks to obtain the block mapping sequence. These stud-
ies [8, 3] mainly aim at the recovery of the weak correla-
tion in block-wise dependent watermarks by exploiting the
weaknesses of image authentication schemes. However, nei-
ther the weaknesses themselves nor the recovery of secret
mapping sequence demonstrate how they can affect a target
application. To this, we develop three counterfeiting attacks
for an image authentication framework.
3. GENERAL FRAMEWORK
We adopt necessary notations from the general water-
marking model [13] to simplify the realization of the image
authentication schemes (i.e. a specific case of block based
watermarking schemes, as mentioned in Section 1) and of
our proposed attacks. In this section, we briefly describe
a general framework for an image authentication scheme,
which our proposed attacks are valid for.
We define an image authentication scheme using three ba-
sic functions: watermark generation, G (·), watermark em-
bedding, E (·), and watermark detection, D (·). A water-
marked image, i¯ is obtained from an original image, i and
an original watermark, w = G (i) = {0, 1}+ with a secret
key, k such that Ek (i, w) = i¯. A detector, D (·) verifies
a watermarked image with the detection key, k such that
Dk (¯i) 6= ⊥, where ‘⊥’ denotes a failure. We note here that
there are certainly some additional steps that the detector
follows for image recovery. However, we limit our attention
to the verification step that returns a failure for an invalid
watermark(s), where an attacker is particularly interested
to break in.
An authentication scheme divides a given input image,
i into non-overlapping blocks, {Bn} and sub-blocks,
{
Bln
}
such that i = {Bn} =
{
Bln
}
. Similarly, w = {wn} =
{
wln
}
,
and i¯ =
{
B¯n
}
=
{
B¯ln
}
. Here, l and n denote the indexes
of the sub-block and block respectively. For example, l ∈
{1, . . . , 4} and n ∈ {1, 2, . . . , Nb} are the indexes of the 4×4
sub-block and 8× 8 image block, where Nb =
(
M
8
× N
8
)
and
M × N is the image size. We note here that not all image
authentication schemes divide an image into the sub-blocks.
In that case, l = 1 and an image is thus simply a set of image
blocks, i.e., i = {Bn} or i¯ =
{
B¯n
}
. Also, Nb can vary from
one schemes to another depending on the image block size.
In embedding, a set of secret mapped block indexes, {q}
are obtained for {n} using the secret key, k such that q =
[(k × n)mod Nb] + 1 for all n, where k is a prime number
and usually chosen from the range of [2, Nb]. Block-wise
dependence is achieved by embedding one block’s watermark
into its mapped block, that is Ek :
{
Bln
} × {wlq} → {B¯ln}
for all l and n. In order to verify a watermarked image, i¯, a
detector regenerates watermarks and extracts their original
version from i¯ such that G :
{
B¯ln
} → {w˜ln}, and E−1k :{
B¯ln
} → {wln}, for all l and n. Here, {w˜ln} = w˜ denotes
the regenerated version of w, and E−1k is the inverse of Ek
that mainly helps extract the embedded watermarks from
the input image, i¯. Thus, the detector authenticates the
given watermarked image such that Dk (¯i) 6= ⊥ if w˜ = w.
4. PROPOSED ATTACKS
In a counterfeiting attack, an attacker generally wants
to validate the detection of an attacked image, which is a
tampered version of a valid watermarked image. Attacker’s
capability plays an important role to succeed with this val-
idation. However, to determine a successful counterfeiting
attack, we need to define its ‘winning condition’.
Let an attacker output an attacked image, i¯a, which is
a maliciously modified version of the original watermarked
image, i¯ = Ek {i, w}. We note here that, i¯a and i¯ may or
may not be ‘perceptually similar’ to each other depending
on the intended use of i¯a. (Perceptual similarity is a water-
marking parameter that defines the minimum distances or
dissimilarities between the perceptual content of two images.
For more precise definition, see ref. [13].) Additionally, the
attacked image may have either an original watermark, w
or a new watermark wa. When a detector authenticates a
valid watermarked image with Dk (¯i) 6= ⊥, we can define the
winning condition for the counterfeiting attack as follows.
Definition 1. (Winning condition.) An attacker outputs
an attacked image, i¯a for an image authentication scheme,
and wins with Dk (¯ia) 6= ⊥.
Now, an attacker of different capability (e.g ., to choose
input image(s) with/without watermark(s), to have access
to component functions of a scheme, or to have knowledge of
the secret parameters) and intention (of using the attacked
image) may output an attacked image in different ways to
satisfy the winning condition. In practice, it is quite rea-
sonable in attack modelling to assume expected capabilities
of an attacker. When a strong attacker may have access to
all component functions of a watermarking scheme and can
choose a watermark or a set of watermarked images, a weak
attacker may only work on a single (or a set of) watermarked
image(s) and with any disclosed secret information. Here,
given access to embedding and detection functions, the at-
tacker may obtain the secret key or block-mapping sequence
using different methods: exhaustive key search[8], verifica-
tion device attack [8], or a sequential scanning method [3].
We generalize the sequential scanning method using verifica-
tion device attack in Getmap (·) (described in next section).
The main difference between the Getmap (·) and those meth-
ods is that Getmap (·) can operate on a set of watermarked
Model 4.1 Getmap
Input: (i) watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
with watermark, w ={
wln
}
; (ii) set of indexes, {u} ⊆ {n} of the selected blocks,{
Blu
}
.
Output: set of mapped blocks’ indexes, {uu} ⊆ {q}, for respec-
tive set of indexes, {u} of the selected blocks.
Begin
1: for all u and l do . getting mapped indexes
2:
{
w˜lu
}← G : {Blu}
3:
{
wlu
}← Embed−1 : {B¯lu}
4: for all index ∈ {u} do
5: if wlindex = w˜
l
u then
6: uu← index
7: end if
8: end for
9: end for
10: for all index ∈ {u} do . correcting ambiguous pair
11: if ∃ {ambiguous index} ⊂ {uu} then
12: for all ambiguous index do
13: if w˜lambiguous index = w
l
another index where,
another index ∈ {n} : another index 6= index then
14: {uu} ← {uu} \ambiguous index
15: end if
16: end for
17: end if
18: end for
19: return {uu}
End
images (watermarked with the same key), instead of only
one watermarked image for mapping sequence recovery.
The output obtained from Getmap (·) can be exploited in
different ways for modifying a (valid) watermarked image to
satisfy the winning condition. To this, we propose three at-
tacks considering three different levels to modify the image;
namely, Counterfeiting Attack 1, Counterfeiting Attack 2,
and Counterfeiting Attack 3. As discussed in [13], we use
X ≈ Y to denote that two images X and Y are perceptually
similar, and X 0 Y to denote that they are not perceptually
similar.
4.1 Getmap Function
Getmap (·) outputs a complete (or partial) set of indexes
for the image blocks (of interest) using G (·) and the inverse
of the modified embedding function, Embed (·). The wa-
termark is generated using G (·) such that G (·) : {B¯lu} →{
w˜lu
}
. Here, {u} ⊆ {n} is the set of indexes of the selected
blocks,
{
Blu
}
that the attacker wants to modify.
Besides, Embed−1 (·) is used to extract the watermarks,{
wlu
}
embedded in the blocks
{
B¯lu
}
such that Embed−1 :{
B¯lu
}→ {wlu}. Unlike Ek (·), Embed (·) embeds the water-
mark(s) directly into the blocks without the secret mapping
sequence (and thus without the key) such that Embed :{
Blu
}× {wlu}→ {B¯lu}. So, the extracted watermark(s) us-
ing Embed−1 (·) remains in the order as they were embed-
ded, which suggests that the match between two versions
of block-wise watermarks,
{
w˜lu
}
and
{
wlu
}
may lead to the
secret mapping sequence.
Getmap (·) starts with finding all possible pairs of original
and mapped block indexes. Here, if the regenerated water-
mark of one block matches with the extracted watermark
of another block, the indexes of those two blocks form an
index pair. Then Getmap (·) checks for any ambiguous pairs
(i.e., an index pair is ambiguous to another pair, when they
have a common mapped block index). For a few ambiguous
Original 
Block Index 
1 3 2 4 
Mapped 
Block Index 
3 2 4 1 
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Block 
Index 
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Block 
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(b) 
Figure 1: Entire block swap: (a) mapping sequence, and (b)
individual steps.
pairs, attacker may try with the detection function directly
to correct them. Otherwise, the attacker may seek another
image(s), which is watermarked with the same key, and use
that image(s) to correct any existing ambiguous pairs.
As mentioned in previous section, Getmap (·) allows an
attacker to use a set of watermarked images to obtain an un-
ambigous mapping sequence. In Model 4.1, we show the ba-
sic Getmap (·) model that operates on a single watermarked
image, i¯. However, we note that it can also operate on a set
of V –valid watermarked images, {¯iv : i¯v = Ek (iv, wv)} for
all v ∈ {1, · · · , V }. In other words, when an attacker has
a set of watermarked images, which are watermarked using
the same embedding key, Getmap (·) can recursively operate
on the images {¯iv} to get the mapped indexes of the selected
image blocks more efficiently.
We show Getmap (·) here as one of few different options to
know the secret mapping of an image authentication scheme.
An attacker may also obtain the key from the disclosure of
secret, or by using an exhaustive key-search that may require
an unrestricted access to the detection function. (Here, by
the term ‘disclosure of secret’, we roughly mean to the dis-
closure of a valid key or a valid mapping sequence.) Once
the key is known, an attacker can easily compute the secret
mapping of the block-indexes and thus outputs an attacked
image to counterfeit the detector.
4.2 Counterfeiting Attack 1
The main idea of this attack is to simply rearrange the im-
age pixels such that original watermarks remain valid for the
new orientation of original pixels. An attacker modifies nei-
ther any pixels nor their watermarks to output an attacked
image. However, the attacked image may be perceptually
different from the input (valid watermarked) image for the
new orientation of original pixels. Two cases can be studied
here.
In the first case, an attacker swaps all the image blocks
with their mapped blocks. Thus, the pixels of an image (or
image blocks) remain the same as the watermarked image
but with different orientation (i.e., their original blcok in-
dexes are now their mapped indexes, and vice versa). We
call this swap of all image blocks as entire block swap. Fig. 1
illustrates an entire-block swap of an image of four blocks.
Here, according to the given mapping sequence in Fig. 1(a),
block B¯l1 is swapped with the block B¯
l
3, block B¯
l
3 is then
swapped with block B¯l2, etc. After completion of all the
block-swap, as we see in Fig. 1(b), the watermarks remain
valid for the new orientation of the blocks.
In the second case, an attacker is interested in particu-
lar image block(s) rather than the all blocks in an image.
Here, an attacker chooses a particular block or a set of
Original 
Block 
Index 
Mapped 
Block 
Index 
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Figure 2: Selected block swap: (a) mapping sequence, and
(b) individual steps.
blocks to swap, which requires correction of the orientation
of swapped blocks’ watermarks to remain valid. We call this
as selected block swap. For example, see Fig. 2, where we il-
lustrate the selected-block-swap for the blocks of index 83
and 37. After the swap, B¯83 will have the pixels of the B¯37
and vice-versa. Thus, the new B¯83 (old B¯37) will have w83,
instead of w9. Similarly, new B¯37 (old B¯83) will have w9 in-
stead of w37, which is embedded in corresponding mapped
block, ¯B189. Thus, w83, w9,and w37 need to be shifted left
accordingly to remain valid.
The above cases of entire block swap and selected block
Model 4.2 Counterfeiting Attack 1
Input: (i) watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
with watermark, w ={
wln
}
; (ii) set of indexes {u} of the selected blocks, {Blu} ;
(iii) set of indexes {uu} ⊂ {q} of corresponding mapped
blocks of the selected blocks (can be obtained fromGetmap (·)
or by using any other key-search algorithm).
Output: attacked image, i¯a 0 i¯ with watermark, w such that{
wln
} ∩ {w˜ln} = φ.
Begin
1: for all n and l do
2:
{
wln
}← Embed−1 : {B¯ln}
3: end for
4: if {u} ∩ {n} 6= φ then . selected block-swap
5: get {uux}, the mapped index of {uu} from {q}
6: for all u and l do
7:
{
B¯lua
}← Embed : {B¯lu}× {wluu}
8: end for
9: for all uu and l do
10:
{
B¯luua
}← Embed : {B¯luu}× {wluux}
11: end for
12: for all uux and l do
13:
{
B¯luuxa
}← Embed : {B¯luux}× {wlu}
14: end for
15: for all u and l do
16: interchange
{
B¯lua
}
and
{
B¯luua
}
17: end for
18: return i¯a ←
({
B¯ln
} \({B¯lu} ∪ {B¯luu} ∪ {B¯luux}))∪{
B¯lua
} ∪ {B¯luua} ∪ {B¯luuxa}
19: else . complete block-swap
20: for all u and l do
21: interchange
{
B¯lu
}
and
{
B¯luu
}
22: end for
23: return i¯a ←
{
B¯ln
}
24: end if
End
Model 4.3 Counterfeiting Attack 2
Input: (i) watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
with watermark, w ={
wln
}
; (ii) set of indexes {u} of the selected blocks, {Blu};
(iii) chosen blocks
{
Clu
}
(for replacing the selected blocks);
Output: attacked image, i¯a 0 i¯ with watermark, w such that{
wln
} ∩ {w˜ln} = φ.
Begin
1: for all u and l do
2:
{
Alu
}← Sim : {Clu}× {B¯lu} . Sim (·)
outputs a block perceptually similar to the input block. here,{
Alu
} ≈ {Clu} 0 {B¯lu} such that {wlu} ← G : {Alu}
3:
{
wlu
}← Embed−1 : {B¯lu}
4:
{
A¯lu
}← Embed : {Alu}× {wluu}
5: replace
{
B¯lu
}
with
{
A¯lu
}
6: end for
7: return i¯a =
({
B¯ln
} \{B¯lu}) ∪ {A¯lu}
End
swap illustrate our Counterfeiting Attack 1 as presented in
Model 4.2. For an entire block swap, the attacker sim-
ply interchanges all the blocks,
{
B¯lu
} |u=n with respective
mapped blocks,
{
B¯luu
} |uu=q as stated in Step 21 in the
model. Besides, Steps 4–18 describe a selected block swap.
Here, as discussed above, watermarks embedded in
{
B¯lu
}
—
the selected blocks,
{
B¯luu
}
—the mapped blocks of
{
B¯lu
}
,
and
{
B¯luux
}
—the mapped blocks of
{
B¯luu
}
, need watermark
correction along with the interchange between
{
B¯lu
}
and{
B¯luu
}
.
We note that an attacker can also shuffle all pixels in a
block to output an attacked image, keeping respective water-
marks’ locations (LSBs— least significant bits) in the block
unchanged. Attacker can do this independently or along
with any of the above cases to introduce a more meaningful
modification in the attacked image.
4.3 Counterfeiting Attack 2
Unlike Counterfeiting Attack 1, where no pixels and wa-
termarks were modified (but their locations), an attacker
may want to modify the pixels of a block or of a set of
blocks to output an attacked image. In this counterfeit-
ing scenario, the original watermarks remain unchanged and
valid for the modified block pixels. In order to modify the
pixels, a set of selected blocks may be either modified di-
rectly or replaced with another set of chosen blocks. This is
illustrated and defined in our Counterfeiting Attack 2 and
presented in Model 4.3.
As illustrated in the Model 4.3, an attacker first out-
puts a set of blocks perceptually similar to the set of chosen
blocks. The output blocks then replace the selected blocks
in the watermarked image, where for the output blocks,
original watermark remains valid. We define this part as
a function Sim (·), which outputs a set of blocks, {Alu} for
the set of chosen blocks,
{
Clu
}
such that Sim :
{
Clu
} ×{
B¯lu
} → {Alu} ∪ {⊥}, where {Alu} ≈ {Clu} 0 {B¯lu}, and{
wlu
} ← G : {Alu}. Here, ⊥ is a failure and {B¯lu} are the
selected blocks to be replaced with the blocks
{
A¯lu
}
.
With the output of Sim (·), the attacker outputs an at-
tacked image. Here, attacker’s success depends on the suc-
cess of the Sim (·) that can perform in different ways de-
pending on the input, and perceptual similarity requirement.
A simple Sim (·), for example, can replace the pixels in a se-
lected block with their average intensity or pixel value (leav-
Model 4.4 Counterfeiting Attack 3
Input: (i) watermarked image, i¯ =
{
B¯ln
}
with watermark, w ={
wln
}
; (ii) set of indexes {u} of the selected blocks, {Blu};
(iii) chosen blocks
{
Clu
}
(for replacing the selected blocks);
(iv) set of indexes {uu} of corresponding mapped blocks of
the selected blocks (can be obtained from Getmap (·) or by
using any other key-search algorithm).
Output: attacked image, i¯a 0 i¯ with different watermark, wa ={
wlna
}
such that
{
wlna
} ∩ {w˜lna} = φ. Here, wa\w ={
wlna
} \{wln} = {wlua} is the watermark generated from
the chosen blocks,
{
Clu
}
.
Begin
1: for all uu, u and l do
2:
{
wluu
}← Embed−1 : {B¯luu}
3:
{
C¯lu
}← Embed : {Clu}× {wluu}
4:
{
wlua
}← G : {Clu}
5:
{
B¯luua
}← Embed : {B¯luu}× {wlua}
6: replace
{
B¯lu
}
with
{
A¯lu
}
7: end for
8: return i¯a =
({
B¯ln
} \{B¯lu}) ∪ {A¯lu}
End
ing their LSBs intact that carry watermark bits). For the
output blocks, the watermarks remain valid if they are gen-
erated from average intensity of a block-pixels. However,
Sim (·) may not work always, specially when perceptual
similarity requirement for the output blocks is very strict,
Sim (·) may return a failure.
As shown in the Model 4.3, once Sim (·) outputs {Alu}, an
attacker extracts the watermarks embedded in the selected
blocks, and embed that extracted watermarks in
{
Alu
}
. Fi-
nally, the watermarked blocks,
{
A¯lu
}
replace the selected
blocks,
{
B¯lu
}
to output an attacked image, i¯a as shown in
the Step 3 to Step 6 of the attack model.
4.4 Counterfeiting Attack 3
As a notion of a stronger attacker, this counterfeiting
scenario introduces the highest level of modification into a
watermarked image. We name it Counterfeiting Attack 3.
Here, an attacker chooses new blocks,
{
Clu
}
to directly re-
place the selected blocks,
{
Blu
}
of a given watermarked im-
age. Thus, the chosen blocks’ watermarks,
{
wlua
}
is re-
quired to be generated and to be re-embedded in the selected
blocks’ mapped blocks,
{
Bluu
}
(as shown in Step 4 and Step
5 in Model 4.4).
This attack also requires the watermark,
{
wluu
}
embed-
ded in the selected blocks,
{
B¯luu
}
to be re-embedded in the
chosen blocks,
{
Clu
}
, which is shown in Step 2 and Step 3 in
the attack model. Finally, chosen blocks replace the selected
blocks to output the attacked image. The severity of this at-
tack is that an attacker with the access to all watermarking
functions can make a more meaningful modifications than
other attacks discussed above.
5. PRACTICABILITYOF THE PROPOSED
ATTACKS
The attack models developed and presented above gener-
alize the key steps of our proposed attacks on the image
authentication scheme framework presented in Section 3.
These attacks exploit the following weaknesses of the image
authentication schemes: (a) the secret mapping sequence of
image blocks, which is a function of a key (of very small key
space); and (b) the watermarks generated from the image
local features (that may cause unreliable detection). Here,
the use of key facilitates to define a linear transform for
obtaining mapping sequence (used to avoid VQ suscepti-
bilities). The need for restoring tampered block(s) with a
good quality, on the other hand, motivates to use the image
local features, which are also used for tamper detection pur-
pose to keep the watermark size small. These motivations
thus mainly help address the following problems of an im-
age authentication scheme: (a) VQ susceptibilities, (b) poor
restoration quality, and (c) limited embedding capacity.
However, such motivations disregard an essential prop-
erty of an image authentication watermark, leading to an
ultimate violation of the systematic definition of security.
For example, the image local features commonly used in the
authentication schemes (e.g., average intensity) do not have
any collision resistance property for authentication water-
mark(s). (Collision resistance is mainly studied for crypto-
graphic hash functions [15]. We can roughly define here a
watermark as collision resistant if it is ‘hard’ to find two im-
age blocks that give the same watermark.) In other words,
different image blocks of having different pixels (or of having
similar pixels in different locations) may give the same fea-
ture. As a result, weaknesses of the authentication schemes
(that can cause security vulnerabilities) are not well under-
stood and are remaining in successive schemes. To demon-
strate the severity and practical consequences of these weak-
nesses, we apply the proposed attacks to the individual im-
age authentication schemes.
Although our attack models theoretically apply to all the
schemes having the weaknesses mentioned above, we study
here the proposed attacks for two schemes [5, 19] that cap-
tures the medical image and other digital image applications.
The Zain and Fauzi scheme (or ZF scheme) [19] is proposed
for tamper detection and recovery of medical images, and
later applied in a PACS-based operational environment [11].
Edupuganti, Shih, and Chang scheme (or ESC scheme) [5]
is recently proposed for tamper localization and recovery of
digital images. Before presenting the experimental results,
we briefly introduce these two schemes below.
5.1 ZF scheme
ZF Scheme [19] operates on 8× 8 non-overlapping blocks
and their 4×4 sub-blocks of an image of size M×N . In order
to get the mapping sequence for the image block indexes, an
1D linear transformation is used. This transform uses a
secret key, which is a prime number chosen from the range
of 1 to the total number of the blocks, which limits the key-
space to
[
2,
(
M
8
× N
8
)]
.
Additionally, 9-bit (1-bit intensity authentication, 1-bit
parity, and 7-bit intensity recovery) watermark is generated
from each 4x4 sub-blocks. This watermark is generated con-
sidering various local properties of the image blocks and sub-
blocks (e.g ., comparing image intensity between a sub-block
and its corresponding block, the odd parity of bit-string rep-
resenting the average intensity of a sub-block, etc.).
ZF scheme avoids VQ susceptibilities and has good local-
ization ability. For higher recovery rate of tampered pixels
and their better restoration quality, this scheme considers
‘average intensity’ of individual sub-blocks as their recovery
watermarks. However, in addition to the common weak-
ness of the small key-space, ZF scheme uses the watermarks
generated from local image properties, which have not been
justified for image integrity verification and authentication.
5.2 ESC scheme
ESC scheme [5] operates on 2× 2 non-overlapping blocks
of an image of size M ×M , where M is a multiple of 2. A
lookup table is generated containing the mapped indexes of
the image block from the set of block indexes, {1, · · · , N}
by using a secret key, where N =
{
M
2
× M
2
}
. The secret
key is chosen as a prime number from the range of the block
indexes, [2, N − 1]. Similar to ZF scheme, a liner transform
is used in the ESC scheme to obtain an initial mapping se-
quence. But, this mapping sequence is modified in ESC
scheme using a ‘block-shift’ operation to construct the final
lookup table.
A 12-bit watermark is generated from a pair of 5-bit fea-
tures (i.e., 5 MSBs of the average intensities) of a paired
blocks, and using a CRC-2 (Cyclic Redundancy Check with
a secret polynomial of degree 2). A block-pair is constructed
using two pixels of similar location in two-halves of the image
blocks. Corresponding mapped block pair is similarly con-
structed considering two-halves of the lookup table. Using
the lookup table, two copies of a 12-bit watermark is embed-
ded in two mapped blocks of the two-halves of the lookup
table. Thus, the ESC scheme has a dual watermarking prin-
ciple for better tamper localization and higher recovery rate.
The dual watermarking principle, 5-bit image block fea-
ture, and use of CRC-2 and lookup table make the ESC
scheme attractive. However, the ESC scheme suffers from
various weaknesses that may cause security problems in a
target application. Like ZF scheme, this scheme has a small
key-space (of [2, N − 1]). Further, use of feature bits, lookup
table and CRC-2 is not justified for any expected security
problems. We examine these weaknesses and identify their
possible reasons when demonstrating the practicability and
consequences of our proposed attacks in following sections.
5.3 Attack Implementation
Our proposed counterfeiting attacks are accomplished in
two parts: secret recovery and forgery. In first part, an at-
tacker tries to recover the secret parameters (e.g ., key, map-
ping sequence). Computation of this part may vary depend-
ing on the design of the target authentication scheme. The
general steps, however, is shown in Getmap (·) in Model 4.1.
We implement the Getmap (·) to demonstrate the relative
computation time for an attacker to obtain the mapping
sequence of both the ZF and ESC schemes for different sets
of indexes. However, in order to implement our attacks on
ZF and ESC schemes, we assume that the attacker has the
secret keys. Since the key space of the both schemes is too
small, it is not difficult to obtain the key at all for an attacker
having limited computational power. For example, for a
typical image of size 512×512 and 1024×1024, the maximum
key size of both schemes are 19-bit and 21-bit respectively.
Theoretically, compared with cryptographic keys, these key
lengths do not provide any protection [4].
In the second part, an attacker has to output a forgery us-
ing the secret key or mapping sequence obtained in the first
part. The output is valid for the embedded watermark, and
is different from any previous outputs of the authentication
scheme. In other words, an attacker outputs a new water-
marked image (in terms of pixels or watermarks, or both),
which remains valid for a given key. Here, an attacker of
different abilities may output forgeries in different levels:
Level 1. An attacked image with original image pixels
and watermarks, but the pixels locations are changed (i.e.,
change of pixel locations only);
Level 2. An attacked image with new pixels keeping the
original watermarks (i.e., change of original pixels only);
Level 3. An attacked image with both new pixels and
their watermarks (i.e., change of both original pixels and
watermarks).
For the first level scenario, we implement Counterfeiting
Attack 1, where the input image blocks are interchanged
with their mapped blocks, as discussed in Section 4.2. We
investigate both the cases of entire-block-swap and selected-
block-swap. For realizing a second level scenario, we im-
plement Counterfeiting Attack 2, where we replace a set of
selected blocks with a set of new blocks keeping the original
watermarks as discussed in Section 4.3. Finally, we imple-
ment Counterfeiting Attack 3 to represent a third level of
counterfeiting scenario. As dicssed in Section 4.4, a new wa-
termark is generated for a chosen blocks and re-embedded
in their mapped blocks pixels. (Few other ways to modify a
valid watermarked image at this level of counterfeiting have
also been shown in the ‘synchronous attack’ [8].)
Therefore, our proposed attacks address the counterfeiting
scenarios in above three different levels, and we argue that
these levels capture all possible ways of modifying a valid
watermarked image. In fact, there can be many other ways
to output an attacked image for the individual counterfeiting
scenarios we introduced here. However, we implement few of
them to demonstrate the practicability and consequences of
counterfeiting a valid watermarked image in different levels.
All necessary simulation and implementation were carried
out using MATLAB (R2012a-7.14.0.739).
6. EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
We performed several experiments with medical and other
digital images for the proposed attacks on selected schemes.
The average computation time is calculated for increasing
number of image blocks up to the image size of 512 × 512.
Fig. 3 shows the computation time of Getmap (·), where
obtaining mapping sequence for ZF scheme is found compu-
tationally less expensive than ESC scheme. Further, Fig. 4
illustrates the average computation time of ZF and ESC
schemes to output an attacked image for each of the pro-
posed attacks. Therefore, an attacked image with any level
of modifications is possible to output in less than a minute
for an input image of size 512 × 512. We note that the
computation time is relative, which varies not only with the
computing power of the operating machine, but also the im-
age size, underlying design of the schemes, etc. Here, an
Intel Core i5 3.2GHz CPU and total 113 images of size up
to 512× 512 are used.
Due to space constraint, a minimum set of examples of the
attacked images from our experimental results are shown in
Fig. 6 for the ESC scheme and Fig. 7 for the ZF scheme.
The modified regions (unless the entire image is modified)
of the attacked images are indicated by a (red) dotted-circle.
Original watermarked images are shown in Fig. 5. All the
attacked images in complete-block-swap of Counterfeiting
Attack 1 are completely distorted as illustrated in Fig. 6(a)
and Fig. 7(a). Although these images may have no practical
implication, they are verified as authentic and un-tampered
by the detector.
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Figure 3: Average computation time of Getmap (·) for ESC
and ZF schemes for images of increasing size (up to 512×512).
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for the images of increasing size (up to 512× 512).
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(a)  (b)  
Watermarked Image Attacked1(ComBlock) Image
Figure 5: Original watermarked image:(a) jetplane.bmp and
(b) OT-MONO2-8-a7.dcm.
As expected, the attacked images in selected block-swap,
shown in Fig. 6(c) and Fig. 7(c), are not completely dis-
torted. Since for the selected-block-swap, we arbitrarily
chose a set of block indexes, the output images had no or
little practical significance. However, satisfying the winning
condition with these attacked images suggests that an at-
tacker may succeed with modifying a valid watermarked im-
age having some significant implications.
In contrast, the attacked images (shown in Fig. 6(b) and
Fig. 7(b)) for the Counterfeiting Attack 2, are almost similar
to the original watermarked images (in Fig. 5). Because, the
function Sim (·) is designed here to quantize a new block
using the average intensity of the selected block pixels as
described in Section 5.3; whereas, there can be many other
ways to design Sim (·).
Besides, the attacked images (shown in Fig. 6(d) and
Fig. 7(d)) for the Counterfeiting Attack 3 illustrate how an
attacker may output a forgery with the highest level mod-
ification. Winning with such a modification opens many
possible ways for an attacker to make a complete practical
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Figure 6: Attacked images for ESC scheme: ‘jetplane.bmp’.
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Figure 7: Attacked images for ZF scheme: ‘OT-MONO2-8-
a7.dcm’.
sense for an attacked image, which however demonstrates
the severity of this attack.
Perceptual differences between attacked and original wa-
termarked images for the proposed attacks, which is not
clear in Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 (that are shrunk to save few space),
can be observed from the PSNR and SSIM values of Ta-
ble 1. However, we stress here that the modifications in at-
tacked images are random, and depends on attacker’s objec-
tives. Therefore, the performance of the attacks and pattern
of consequences cannot be determined from any qualitative
analysis (e.g ., using PSNR or SSIM) of the attacked images.
Both the ZF and ESC schemes accept all the attacked im-
Table 1: Perceptual Differences Between Output and Input
Images of the Proposed Attacks
jetplane.bmp OT-MONO2-8-a7.dcm
Attacks (ESC scheme) (ZF scheme)
PSNR(dB) SSIM PSNR(dB) SSIM
Entire Block Swap 6.36 0.3016 10.55 0.0538
Selected Block Swap 11.38 0.6682 32.61 0.9887
Counterfeiting Attack 2 10.54 0.6689 26.92 0.9042
Counterfeiting Attack 3 27.72 0.9916 49.14 0.9988
ages (including the images shown above) as authentic, where
apparently they are not. The implications of the attacked
images can be more severe if the attacks are applied in a
more meaningful way. However, the examples shown in the
Fig. 6 and Fig. 7 reasonably show that Counterfeiting At-
tack 1, Counterfeiting Attack 2, and Counterfeiting Attack 3
render the schemes invalid for their intended purpose. They
also suggest the similar consequences for other image au-
thentication schemes having similar weaknesses.
7. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we proposed three new counterfeiting at-
tacks, and presented their models for block wise dependent
fragile watermarking schemes. To capture the broad range
of the schemes, their general framework is also developed.
In earlier studies [8, 3], it is shown that a weak correlation
in block-wise dependent watermarks leaves open counter-
feiting opportunities, although those watermarks can still
resist the VQ attack. However, such an obvious weakness
in a watermarking scheme does not always clearly show how
that can be exploited in a target application. Here, our
proposed attack models capture all the possible instances
in three different levels of counterfeiting. Experimental re-
sults successfully demonstrated their practical consequences
for two selected schemes that deal with general and medical
image application scenarios.
As a final remark, we note here that the contribution pre-
sented in this paper can be a paradigm to identify the secu-
rity levels required for a watermarking target application as
well as to explore the important properties of a watermark-
ing scheme that can make the scheme vulnerable and may
render it eventually unusable for its intended purpose(s).
Identifying such properties not only help justify the merit
of a scheme in an application scenario, but also show the
potential security holes for all the schemes in the category.
Future Work. Many image authentication schemes includ-
ing ZF [19] and ESC [5] schemes do not consider the required
properties of the watermarks explicitly, which suggests that
the properties either have not been studied yet or are not
well understood. This can be a main source of several se-
curity problems including what we discussed in this paper.
However, this paper has a narrow focus on the properties
of watermark(s) required for the target applications, which
can be an interesting topic for future watermarking research.
Therefore, this study leaves an open question to finding a
suitable one-to-one mapping and collusion resistant water-
mark(s) to avoid the counterfeiting vulnerabilities in an im-
age authentication scheme(s).
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